How it works
What stays private
Robinhood Chain, Tempo, Base, Ethereum, Elysium and BNB Chain are public ledgers. Gloam adds a shielded pool on top. Privacy here means unlinkability and hidden holdings, not that transactions vanish from the explorer. Here is exactly what that does and does not hide.
- Hidden
- the link, the bag
- Public
- deposits + exits
- Anon set
- more users = stronger
- Private swaps
- who is hidden, amounts public
What an explorer actually shows
This is the part people get wrong, so it is worth stating plainly. Put your own address into the block explorer and you will find your shield deposit: a public transaction from your wallet, into the pool, for the exact amount, and its Shielded event carries your address, the amount, and the note commitment together. Nothing about the deposit is hidden.
The commitment is a Poseidon hash (a 32-byte value). If you paste it into the explorer search you get nothing back, because it is not a transaction or an address, just a leaf in the pool's Merkle tree. Querying the contract returns only commitmentSeen(commitment) == true. The hash reveals no amount, no secret, and no owner on its own.
The privacy is on the spend. When you later send or cash out, the zero-knowledge proof shows that you own some note in the tree and publishes a nullifier, without revealing which note. So a withdrawal to a fresh address, or a private send, cannot be linked back to your deposit. That unlinkability is the product.
What stays hidden
- The link between your deposit and any later spend or exit
- How much you hold while it is in the vault
- Who paid whom, and how much, on a private send (live on mainnet and testnet)
- Who made a private swap, which balance it came from, and where the output goes next (mainnet)
What the public still sees
- Each shield deposit: your address, the asset, and the amount
- Each cash out: the asset, the amount, and the destination address
- Each private swap: the two tokens and the two amounts. A swap the same size as a recent deposit, or a cash out the same size as a swap's output, is easy to match. See private swaps
- That the pool was used, the caller of each transaction, and timing
- Every commitment and nullifier as opaque hashes, plus the pool total
The anonymity set is the whole game
A shielded pool hides you in a crowd. If you are the only note of your size, an exit of that size is trivially yours. The mainnet pools are brand new, so their crowd is thin at first, and the testnet pools are small too. Treat unlinkability as weak until they fill up. This is true of every shielded pool, Gloam included. We would rather say it than let you assume more privacy than you have.
Making a cash out harder to link
A cash out is public, so the easiest way to link one to you is its size, its timing and where it goes. The cash out screen lets you change all three:
- A different amount. Cash out part of a balance, not the exact sum that came in. The app first sets that part aside in its own private note, then cashes it out. It says so when the amount sits within 1% of money you added or were paid in the last 30 days, or when you added money in the last few hours. It only reads this browser's own history.
- Later. Within an hour, 6 hours or a day, at a random time inside the window. The proof is made in your browser at once and the relay sends it then. The proof binds the amount and the recipient, so the relay can only send it as it is or not at all. The vault accepts the proof however long it waits, and takes its fee when it lands, at the rate that day. If the relay can't send it, nothing moves and the money shows in your balance again. Once it starts going out it can't be cancelled, and it shows as on its way until the network settles it.
- In pieces. A cash out arrives at once by default. For a stablecoin above 5 you can switch on Privately: 2 to 4 pieces of ordinary sizes, none matching money you added or were paid recently, each sent later at its own random time. The app suggests it when an amount matches money you added. Pieces that all land at one address can still be added up there, so a busy address (an exchange deposit address, say) or a different address for each piece hides more.
- Another address. A fresh wallet that never deposited is best. The app warns when the address is the connected wallet or one that deposited.
What a waiting proof shows. Sending later hides when you asked for the cash out, but not entirely. Every proof is made against the vault's root at that moment, and the vault keeps every root, so anyone who rebuilds the tree can tell roughly when a proof was made. Cash outs proven together, like the pieces of one cash out, can be grouped that way, and one proven right after a deposit points back at it. While the app is open, Gloam makes a fresh proof of each waiting cash out and swaps it in on the relay, with the same recipient, amount and send time. It does this now and then, and once more shortly before each one goes out. A cash out that goes out while the app is closed keeps the root from when its proof was last made, so leaving the app open until it goes hides the most.
What we will not promise
- Invisibility from law, courts, or a subpoena
- Privacy once you cash out to a public address
- Safety if your device or browser is compromised
- Strong anonymity while the pool has few users
- Recovery if you lose a note secret
Private from the public, not from an operator
Some chains offer privacy through operator-run environments, for example Tempo Zones, where a designated operator sees every transaction inside the zone and only the wider public is kept out. Gloam is a different model. It is a self-custodial shielded pool with no operator in the middle: only you hold the note secret, and only a party you choose sees a balance, through selective disclosure. When Gloam settles a private agent payment over x402, the payer and the payee learn the amount and no one else does. Where a regulated asset needs oversight, compliance visibility is opt-in per payment through an issuer-scoped disclosure, never a standing view handed to an operator. For how this compares with Zama, Arcium, Tempo Zones and others, see how Gloam compares.
How we count people
To see how many people use Gloam, the app sends our server your connected address and which kinds of thing you did, such as claiming a payment or sending privately. Those go a few minutes after they happen, together, so the request never lines up with a payment. The server turns the address into a one-way code with a secret key (HMAC-SHA256) and adds the code to a HyperLogLog: a counter that keeps registers, not the codes it was given. It can say about how many different wallets it has seen, and no list of them exists. No address is stored, and no count is tied to a payment, an amount or a claim code.
Two honest limits. Our server sees the address while it makes the code, as it does when it screens a deposit or a cash out. And someone holding both the secret key and the counters could check whether a wallet they already know is probably in them, in all, for one kind of action or on one day. The key lives only on our server, and a day is the finest grain kept.
What is new and what is not
Gloam is not new cryptography. It is a new building block for finance: private payments you can prove. Here is exactly where the line sits.
Not new
- The private pool design. Notes, nullifiers and a Merkle tree come from the Zcash lineage, starting in 2016. Tornado, Railgun and Cloak use the same pattern.
- Selective disclosure as an idea. Zcash and Railgun viewing keys, Privacy Pools, and Zama decryption rights all let a holder show something to someone.
New, as far as our research found
- Payroll total proof. It proves a run of up to 32 payments adds up to exactly a total, all funded by the prover, without showing who got what. We found nothing like it. See payroll total.
- Proofs scoped to one reader. Who the proof is for (a label), when it expires, the chain and the pool are hashed into one public
contextinput that is bound into the proof, in thesolvency,receiptandpayroll_totalcircuits. Change the label and the proof fails. Anyone can check it in a browser, with no wallet, at /verify. Viewing keys, the usual alternative, show your whole history and cannot be taken back. - Private payments for AI agents. A private payment method proposed for the Machine Payments Protocol from Tempo and Stripe (tempoxyz/mpp-specs#376; MPP had no private method), private x402 payments, and an MCP server that gives agents handles instead of secrets, with spending limits. See agents.
Honest limit. A reader can still forward a proof. It will say who it was made for and when it expires, but nothing stops the forwarding itself. A designated-verifier mode, where only the named reader can be convinced, is next.
Security and compliance
Passkey lock (optional)
Your notes, and the key that opens payments to your Gloam address, are encrypted at rest in this browser under a device key. In Settings you can protect that key with a passkey: Face ID, Touch ID or a security key. Gloam asks the passkey for a secret only it can produce (the WebAuthn PRF extension), uses it to wrap the key, and stores only the wrapped copy. Each time you open the app, the passkey unlocks it. There is no server or account behind this, and removing the passkey asks for it first.
Backups are separate. A backup holds your balances themselves, so restoring one needs only the backup, plus its passphrase if you set one, on any browser. It never needs the passkey. If you lose the passkey, a backup is the only way back. Browsers or passkeys without PRF support keep the device key, unchanged.
Sanctions screening
Before a deposit, and before the relay submits a cash out, Gloam checks the public addresses involved against the OFAC list of sanctioned digital currency addresses: the wallet that deposits, and the address a cash out pays. Nothing private is screened. Notes, receive tags, amounts and private sends are never looked at.
- Against what: a snapshot of the EVM addresses in the 0xB10C OFAC list, built from the OFAC SDN list. It ships with the app with its source commit and date (snapshot of 2026-10-05, 124 addresses) and is refreshed by a script, so it can lag the official list until the next refresh.
- When: in the app before your wallet signs a deposit, on the server at
/api/screen, and inside the relay before it checks or sends anything. - What you see: a blocked wallet gets one neutral message, "This wallet can't use Gloam.", and nothing more.
- Optional: an operator can add the Chainalysis free sanctions API by setting
CHAINALYSIS_API_KEYon the server.
Screening lives in the app and the relay, not in the vault contract, which stays permissionless.
Stablecoin issuer policies on Tempo (TIP-403)
Every stablecoin on Tempo points at a transfer policy in Tempo's TIP-403 registry: open to all, closed to all, the issuer's allowlist or blocklist, or separate lists for senders and recipients. The token checks it on every transfer. Gloam respects it at the two places value meets a public wallet: a deposit is a transfer from your wallet into the vault, and a cash out is a transfer from the vault to a public address.
- Deposit: your wallet must be allowed to send the stablecoin, and the vault must be allowed to receive it.
- Cash out: the vault must be allowed to send it, and the destination must be allowed to receive it. If the destination's own Tempo receive policy would refuse the payment, Gloam says so instead of letting it be held. If that policy can't be read, the relay sends nothing and asks you to try again.
- When: next to sanctions screening, in the app before your wallet signs, at
/api/screen, and inside the relay. These are read-only calls to the chain. A wallet the issuer does not allow sees the same neutral message. - Private sends move no tokens, so the policy never sees them, and nothing private is read.
- Private swaps do move tokens: from the vault to the swap's escrow and router, through Tempo's stablecoin exchange, and back into the vault. The token checks its policy on each of those transfers, and if one is refused the whole swap reverts.
The token enforces its policy on-chain whatever Gloam does. That makes this compliant privacy with no operator: the issuer keeps its controls at the public edges, nobody sees inside the vault, and there is no Gloam operator in between. As of October 2026 on Tempo Moderato, OUSD and PathUSD both use policy 1, open to all.
Issuer freeze risk. An issuer can also pause its stablecoin, or set a policy that stops the vault itself from sending it. Then no balance in that stablecoin can be cashed out until the issuer lifts it, and nobody, the Gloam team included, can move it out another way. The app reads the vault's standing for each stablecoin, shows it as "Issuer policy" in the "What the explorer shows" card, and warns before you deposit or cash out if the vault is blocked.
No admin withdraw
Nobody, including the Gloam team, can move pooled funds. The vault has no withdraw function for its owner: money leaves only through a cash out that carries a valid proof.
Timelock on rule changes
After setup, every change to how proofs, rates or prices are checked is queued on-chain and can only take effect three days later, in public.
Relay limits
The relay submits only the vault's private send and cash out, private swaps through the swap routers, and the payment message board. It dry-runs every call first, cannot change a cash out's recipient or amount (both are bound in the proof), cannot change what a swap delivers or where (the escrow address binds it), and rate limits each device and each network. A cash out scheduled for later is kept as the proof and its public inputs, never a secret, and is dropped once it is sent, cancelled or can no longer go out. While it waits, the app can swap its proof for a fresher one of the same cash out: the relay takes it only for the same balance, recipient, amount and asset, more than a minute before the send time, after the same dry run, and nothing else about the cash out changes.
Before you use mainnet
These are the honest gaps to know about first:
- Final keys on mainnet, dev keys on testnet. The multi-party trusted setup closed on 17 October with 13 contributors, and mainnet uses its final keys, as do Base Sepolia and Ethereum Sepolia. The Robinhood Chain and Tempo testnet setup had a single contributor, so testnet is for practice only.
- External review covers the vault only. Kann Audits reviewed the vault contracts (report, 1 November 2026) and found no Critical, High or Medium issues. The swap routers, circuits, app and relay were not part of it. Before that came several internal rounds, with fixes deployed, and a review before launch that finished on 20 October with no Critical or High findings open. Deposit limits cap how much each pool can hold: 50,000 per deposit and 2,500,000 in total for each stablecoin, and 2,500,000 per deposit and 25,000,000 in total for $GLOAM.
- A payer can take back a payment until it is claimed. The payer creates the payment, so they know its key too. Claiming moves it into a new note only the payee knows, and after that the payer can no longer touch it.
- Thin anonymity set. The mainnet pools are new, so there are few notes to hide among at first, and unlinkability is weak for now.
- Issuer freeze. A stablecoin issuer can freeze the vault contract. Our answer is to screen deposits so flagged funds never enter.
- Private swaps show their amounts. Who swapped stays private, but the tokens and amounts are public. If someone breaks a swap on purpose, 99% of the note comes back as a refund. The old sealed trade is retired.
See the production gate for the full list, and the threat model for who can do what. More detail: How shield works and the whitepaper.